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After the liberalisation of the gas industry, trading hubs have emerged in Europe. Although these hubs
appear to be liquid market places fostering gas-to-gas competition, the efﬁciency of the gas market
remains a topic of interest as a fair share of gas is still traded through long-term contracts with prices
linked to the oil price while the number of gas suppliers to the European market is limited. In order to
assess the efﬁciency of the gas market, we analyse the day-ahead spot price at the Dutch gas hub over the
period 2011–2014. We ﬁnd that the oil price had a small positive impact on the gas price. Changes in the
concentration on the supply side did not affect the movement in gas prices. The availability of gas in
storages and the outside temperature negatively inﬂuenced the gas price. We also ﬁnd that the gas price
was related to the production of wind electricity. Overall, we conclude that the day-ahead gas prices are
predominantly determined by gas-market fundamentals. Policies to further integrate gas markets within
Europe may extend this gas-to-gas competition to a larger region.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The institutions of the European gas market have changed
considerably in the last decade. Trading at gas hubs such as the
National Balancing Point (NBP) in the United Kingdom and the
Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in The Netherlands have gained rapid
importance (Heather, 2012). Parallel to this development, the
convention of explicitly linking the gas price to the oil price has
lost importance. Because oil and gas were substitutes in many
processes, oil indexation became the leading pricing mechanism
for gas in the 20th and early 21st century in Europe. Since the gas
market has changed signiﬁcantly in recent years, however, gas-to-
gas competition seems to have become the dominant price me-
chanism (IGU, 2014). Moreover, recent evidence shows thatr Ltd. This is an open access article
and Business, University of
r).national gas markets in North-west Europe are increasingly in-
tegrated with each other, resulting in a North-west European
market covering countries as the UK, France, The Netherlands,
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Italy and Austria (Growitsch et al.,
2012; Kuper and Mulder, 2014; Neumann and Cullmann, 2012;
Petrovich, 2013; Timera Energy, 2013).
Nevertheless, there are still concerns regarding the intensity of
competition within the European gas market as the dispersion of
reserves is concentrated while the number of suppliers is limited.
If ﬁrms are able to exert market power, above-competitive gas
prices may result which reduces consumer welfare. Furthermore,
the gas market faces periodical shocks in both supply and demand,
which distort the gas prices. For example, the extremely cold
weather throughout Europe in February 2012 led to a (perceived)
tightness of the market supply. In addition, the Fukushima disaster
and the consequent nuclear shutdown in Japan led to a substantial
increase in Asian demand for LNG.
A number of different approaches to understand the factors
behind gas prices have been used in the recent literature. Severalunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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between gas and oil prices (e.g. Asche et al., 2006; Regnard and
Zakoïan, 2011, for the European gas market and Erdős, 2012; Villar
and Joutz, 2006, for the US gas market). Some papers have em-
phasised the role of other supply and demand fundamentals, in
particular for the short-run price development because energy
commodities differ in fuel density and accordingly in production,
transportation and environmental cost (Smith, 2004; Mu, 2007;
Brown and Yücel, 2008). Ramberg and Parsons (2012) show that
the vector error-correction models typically applied in the co-in-
tegration framework do not perform very well in explaining short
run gas price development. In another fashion, Nick and Thoenes
(2014) investigated the effect of market shocks in a structural
vector autoregressive (SVAR) model and found that temperature,
storage and supply shocks lead to relatively short lasting effects on
the gas price whereas oil and coal price shocks result in more
persistent effects on the gas price.
With the strongly reduced share of explicit oil indexation and
the reduced options for short run gas–oil substitution in North-
west Europe (Stern, 2007, 2009), the supply and demand funda-
mentals might have become more important for the development
of the gas price at liberalised hubs. This is the reason that we es-
timate a reduced form model of the gas price which enables us to
assess the impact of the key fundamental factors on the short term
movements of the gas price.
The main question addressed in this paper is: what drives
natural gas prices at liberalised European gas markets? More
speciﬁc, to what extent is the gas price tied to oil and/or coal and
what is the effect of other supply and demand fundamentals? This
paper contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive
empirical analysis, facilitated by the collection of data for a broad
set of gas-market variables. Moreover, while other papers have
largely focussed on a single national market, we include a number
of variables related to the North-west European market for natural
gas. We deﬁne the North-west European gas market as the mar-
kets in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the UK. The gas networks in these countries are
closely connected. In addition, gas is being exported from the
Netherlands to each of these markets, which fosters the integra-
tion of the markets. As a result, changes in fundamental factors
affecting supply or demand in these countries may also affect the
gas price at the TTF.
This paper analyses the development of spot market gas prices
at the TTF hub over the period 2011–2014 by assessing the con-
tribution of a number of supply and demand fundamentals. We
focus at the TTF since it is viewed as a suitable reference hub
which is the most liquid and mature trading hub in continental
Europe (Heather, 2012). The annual volume delivered at TTF is
about 40 bcm while the total gas consumption in the Netherlands
is about 45 bcm, which indicates that the TTF is important for the
Dutch gas market (GTS, 2012). Moreover, the TTF appears to be
strongly integrated with gas hubs in neighbouring markets such as
the NCG in Germany (ACM, 2014; Kuper and Mulder, 2014). As a
result, the prices on TTF and the other hubs show almost the
identical pattern. The day-ahead price is appropriate because it
refers to one of the most liquid traded products, which makes that
the price of this product is strongly related to the underlying
factors (Heather, 2010). The liquidity of the day-ahead products
follows from the depth of this market, which is signiﬁcantly higher
than for the other products (ACM, 2014).1 Hence, in the short run,
fundamental supply and demand factors are especially important
for the development of the day-ahead price. The fundamentals1 The depth of a market is measured by the number of additional lots of 30 MW
traders could sell or buy without inﬂuencing the price (ACM, 2014).include the outside temperature, the macroeconomic develop-
ment, the price of substitute fuels, the concentration in physical
terms on the supply side to the European market, the expected
level in global gas reserves and the development in renewable
energy. While assessing the impact of these factors, we control for
a number of incidental events such as the inability of Gazprom to
meet unexpected demand and the Fukushima disaster.
We ﬁnd no evidence of a strong tie between the spot prices of
natural gas, crude oil and coal over 2011–2014. The development
of the gas price is mainly determined by own fundamentals.
Though, a short-run link between the three energy commodities is
present via arbitraging between oil indexed gas and hub gas as
well as via fuel competition in the power market. Despite being a
fairly concentrated market, the changes in the daily gas price do
not depend on the changes in the structure on the supply side.
Overall, we conclude that the day-ahead gas prices are pre-
dominantly determined by gas-market fundamentals.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
describes the method of research which includes a description of
the variables which are used to measure the fundamentals behind
the gas price. This section also presents the data which is used to
estimate the model. Section 3 presents and discusses the results.
The conclusions and policy recommendations are given in Section
4.2. Method and data
We estimate a reduced-form model of the gas price. This model
is based on the idea that the gas price is a function of shifts in the
demand and the supply curves. To determine the effect of supply
and demand factors on the gas price the equation ϕ= ( )X YP ,TTF is
estimated, where X and Y contain the demand and supply vari-
ables and PTTF reﬂects equilibrium gas prices on both the supply
and demand schedules, i.e. the points of intersection of both
curves. In this section we elaborate on the key factors affecting the
demand and supply curves behind the TTF price. The dataset for
the quantitative analysis comprises data from 4/1/2011–30/12/
2014. It consists of daily observations except for the macro-
economic indicator which is available on a monthly frequency. The
dataset does not include prices for weekends limiting the analysis
to weekdays only. Table 1 gives an overview of all variables, how
they are measured and the data sources. See Fig. 1 for the day-
ahead gas price
2.1. Price of oil
A factor which may affect both the demand and the supply of
gas is the price of oil. The price of oil is relevant because of sub-
stitution properties of gas and oil (Villar and Joutz, 2006). Sub-
stitution is primarily relevant in the electricity generation and the
heavy industry. If the price of oil rises, burning gas becomes re-
latively cheaper, increasing the demand for gas which results in an
upward pressure on the gas price. However, Stern (2007, 2009)
argues that short-run fuel switching is hardly relevant anymore in
West Europe because oil has virtually disappeared in most sta-
tionary energy sectors, maintenance of dual-fuel burners is ex-
pensive, tight environmental standards as well as the inefﬁciency
of using oil in new gas burning technologies.
In addition to the apparent lack of short-run substitutability
there are several other reasons why oil and gas should have dis-
tinct price dynamics (Smith, 2004). The transportation costs differ
and there are differences in the costs of production, processing,
storage and environment. Moreover, the differences in character-
istics have led gas and oil prices to be determined in different
geographical market places, as noted by Ramberg and Parsons
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Description Source Frequency (unit)
Heating degree days West European gas consumption weighted average
number of heating degree days
European Climate Assessment and Dataset (ECA&D) Daily (degree
celcius)
TTF gas price Title Transfer Facility day-ahead natural gas price ICIS Heren Daily (€/MWh)
Brent oil price European Brent crude oil spot price ICIS Heren Daily (€/Barrel)
NW European coal price Northwest European coal price Bloomberg Daily (€/Tonne)
CO2 price Price of European carbon credits Bloomberg Daily (€/Tonne)
Gas storage Deviation in the daily ﬁlling degree of West European gas
storage facilities from the daily average ﬁlling degree of
the past 3 years
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), Cedigaz Underground
Gas Storage Database (CUGS) and Gasunie Transport
Services (GTS)
Daily (Percentage
points)
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman in-
dex (HHI)
Aggregated squared market shares of suppliers Eclipse-Own calculations Daily (index
[0,10000])
Macroeconomic indicator Monthly gas consumption weighted average production
volume index of the manufacturing sector in West Europe
Eurostat Monthly (indice)
Wind electricity Germany Day-ahead prediction of electricity generation from Ger-
man wind power
50 Hertz, Amperion, TenneT, TransnetBW Daily (MWh)
Global discoveries Dummy indicating announcement and period after large
global gas discoveries
WoodMackenzie –
Fukushima nuclear disaster Dummy separating the period before and after the Fu-
kushima nuclear disaster on the 11th of March 2011
– –
Cold spell in Europe 2012 Dummy indicating the period of extremely cold weather
throughout Europe in February 2012
– –
Fig. 1. TTF gas price and Brent crude oil price per week day, 2011–2014 (Source:
ICIS Heren).
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exist, such as Brent and West Texas Intermediate, their prices are
usually correlated. Natural-gas prices at the hubs, however, are
much more subject to regional supply and demand conditions. The
regional gas markets are not independent from each other, and
perhaps are becoming increasingly tied (Stern and Rogers, 2014),
but regional prices can move in very different directions as can be
seen from the recent divergence in European and North-American
gas prices (Mulder, 2013).
Even if the supply and demand dynamics of gas and oil differ
and there is a lack of short run substitution, the price of oil in-
ﬂuences the price of gas if the gas price is explicitly linked to the
oil price in contracts, as was a common practice in Europe since
the 1960s. The key question is how important this price me-
chanism still is for the West European market. The answer is
somewhat difﬁcult to obtain because most information sits in the
private domain. The IGU (2014) nevertheless estimates that the
share of oil indexation in North-west Europe decreased from 72%
in 2005 to 20% in 2013.
Because of the remaining oil-indexation contracts, traders try
to arbitrage between spot and contract gas insofar this is possible
given the minimum take obligations in these contracts (Stern andRogers, 2014). If the gas spot price is below the oil-indexed con-
tract price, the demand at hubs for spot priced gas will increase
whereas demand for oil indexed gas decreases. This will increase
the price of spot gas. Consequently, buyers with long term con-
tracts try to decrease their nominations up to the minimum take
obligation resulting in lower upstream production and total mar-
ket supply. The opposite mechanism holds if the gas spot price is
above the oil-indexed contract price.
Because of these remaining arbitrage possibilities, we include
the price of oil as an independent variable. The spot price of Brent
oil is the most relevant crude oil price for the West European
market. Prices are speciﬁed in US Dollar per barrel. In order to
account for exchange rate ﬂuctuations the US Dollar per barrel, the
price is divided by the day-ahead US Dollar/Euro exchange rate to
obtain a day-ahead Euro per barrel price.
The other relevant variables for inter-fuel competition that are
included are the price of North-west European coal and the price
of CO2 in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, both in
Euro per tonne as reported by Bloomberg (Fig. 2).
2.2. Market structure
Although a large numbers of traders are active on the gas hubs
like TTF, the supply to the gas market is concentrated because of
the limited number of producers. The main sources of supply to
the North-west European market are ‘indigenous’ production in
The Netherlands and UK as well as imports from Russia, Norway,
Algeria and LNG, primarily coming from Qatar. This supply can be
distinguished in inﬂexible and ﬂexible supply (Timera Energy,
2013). Inﬂexible supply of gas include pipeline-contract gas up
until take-or-pay volumes, destination-inﬂexible LNG cargoes
(mainly into Southern Europe) and indigenous production which
do not seem to respond to hub price signals in practice. While
these tranches may have some ﬂexibility (e.g. to allow for sea-
sonality), they generally ﬂow irrespective of the absolute level of
hub prices and have therefore no primary impact. The ﬂexible
supply of gas consists of pipeline-contract gas between the take-
or-pay and maximum annual contracted volume, un-contracted
pipeline import ﬂexibility from mainly Norway and Russia and
ﬂexible LNG supply.
The limited number of producers of gas to the European market
raises some concerns on the degree of competitiveness of the gas
Fig. 2. Coal price and CO2 price, per day, 2011–2014 (Source: Bloomberg). (a) Northwest European Coal price (b)European CO2 price.
Fig. 3. Daily average market share per country per year, 2011–2014 (source: own
calculations based on data from Eclipse).
Table 2
Daily average gas supply per country/source (GWh).Source: Eclipse.
2011 2012 2013 2014
LNG 2367 1674 1183 1055
Russia 2821 2675 3257 2829
Norway 2643 3095 3045 3019
The Netherlands 2098 2151 2261 1875
UK 1181 1032 981 1001
Algeria 994 1164 970 909
Total 12,104 11,791 11,697 10,688
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dominated by large state-controlled companies. This gives rise to
concerns regarding oligopolistic market behaviour and profound
effects following supply disruptions. If ﬁrms hold a strategic po-
sition, they are able to execute market power resulting in prices
above the competitive level. It should be noted that other parts of
the gas market than production affect the degree of competition as
well. Gas producers are often not responsible for transportation
and each part of the value chain has its own dynamics. However,
production is essential to understand competition in the market
for gas as it are producers who determine the gas volumes the
other value chains work with (Brakman et al., 2009).
In terms of industry structure the gas market is commonly
described by a Cournot conﬁguration as the market trades in the
homogenous good gas,2 prices observed are above marginal costs,
quantity is the strategic variable and a limited number of ﬁrms
supply the market. To assert the degree of competition in a market
the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is widely used. The HHI is
an indicator for market concentration, deﬁned as: = ∑ =HHI Si
n
i1
2
where Si is the market share of ﬁrm i and n the number of ﬁrms;
i.e. the aggregate of the supplier's squared market shares. As such
it is an indicator for the structure of a market and signals the
potential for the exertion of market power by ﬁrms. We, therefore,
include the HHI in our model which is based on the supply coming
from different players to the North-west European market.
The supply data includes supply from Russia, Norway, Algeria,
LNG, The Netherlands and UK.3 The daily supply is based on the
supply entering the system via pipelines from Norway, The Neth-
erlands, UK, Russia and Algeria and total LNG supply (Fig. 3 and
Table 2).4 The data does not allow us to determine the source of
LNG entering the system and therefore LNG is treated as a single
market supplier.
Daily production data for The Netherlands and UK is readily
available, but the relevant export of other suppliers to North-west
Europe is not. To determine imports via the pipeline system from
the most important ‘foreign’ suppliers, Russia, Norway and Algeria,
all those gas transmission points at the ‘border’ of the market via2 Quality differences in terms of energetic content exist, however, trade and
prices are based on energy content rather than physical volume.
3 It should be noted that because production in other European countries (e.g.
Germany, Denmark and Italy) is excluded, total supply is somewhat under-
estimated and the market shares and HHI are somewhat overestimated. The joint
production in the omitted countries is, however, small.
4 It is not possible to distinguish the type of supply by ﬂexibility. The vast
majority of the production from Norway, Algeria and Russia enters the European
system via pipelines, however, these countries also ship some LNG to North-west
Europe.which production of the respective suppliers can enter the pipe-
line system in Central and West Europe are identiﬁed.5 Generally,
there exists more than one receiving Transmission System Op-
erator (TSO) at a gas transmission border point. The physical ﬂow
in MWh reported by each TSO at border points is extracted from
Eclipse. For Norway 16 relevant border points are identiﬁed, ar-
riving in The UK, France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany
(see appendix A for a list of all the identiﬁed entry points for each
non-indigenous supply source). For Russia, 4 relevant border
points in 3 countries are identiﬁed: one for gas entering via Uk-
raine and Slovenia, two for the direct connection between Ger-
many and Russia via the Nordstream pipeline and one for gas5 Gas from Russia to North-west Europe is measured at the border points
Polen–Belarus and Slowakije–Ukraine.
Fig. 4. Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) from 2011–2014 (daily data). Source:
own calculations based on data from Eclipse.
8 For Austria and Denmark, no data on storages are available unfortunately. The
D. Hulshof et al. / Energy Policy 94 (2016) 480–491484entering Europe via Belarus and Poland. Algerian production en-
ters the pipeline system at 4 border points in Spain and Italy.
Regarding LNG, 18 relevant terminals in 7 countries are identiﬁed.
The production data limits us to study the period after 1/1/2011 as
data is largely unavailable prior to this date.
The total market supply is estimated as the aggregate of supply
from each source and consequently the HHI is constructed by
summing over all the squared market shares of the 6 supply
sources. The HHI has increased from approximately 1900–2100
from 2011–2014 (see Fig. 4).6 Table 2 shows that LNG supply to
Europe has more than halved in that period, which is an important
contribution to the increase in the HHI. The decrease in European
LNG supply occurs simultaneously with the surge in Asian LNG
demand after 2011. The increases in supply of the two largest
suppliers, Russia and Norway, have contributed to the increase in
the HHI (Fig. 3).
2.3. Storage
Storage of gas plays an important role for hub prices as storages
can be used for inter-temporal arbitrage. The theory of gas storage
states that the level of inventories affects the difference between spot
and futures gas prices (Kaldor, 1939; Brennan, 1958; Fama and
French, 1987). Brown and Yücel (2008) ﬁnd that natural gas storage
has an effect on the price of gas. Due to the fact that the consumption
of gas is seasonal while the production has generally more limita-
tions to adapt its levels accordingly, storages can be used.7 These
inventories are ﬁlled in the summer for use in the winter. In addition,
above normal heating and cooling-degree days put upward pressure
on the gas price. Inventories above the seasonal norm depress prices
while inventories below the seasonal norm have a positive effect on
prices. Disruptions in production might also have a positive effect on
prices. The above authors calculate a storage differential as the dif-
ference between storage in a given week and the average for that
week over the past ﬁve years. These authors ﬁnd that when the
ﬁlling degree of a natural gas storage facility is above the seasonal
norm, it depresses natural gas prices.
Traditionally, storage capacity in Europe is mainly used to
smooth out the seasonal demand shape. The storage facilities6 The HHI is constructed by summing over all the squared market shares of the
6 supply sources.
7 Note that the Groningen gas ﬁeld in the Netherlands is a prominent exception
on this rule. This ﬁeld acts as a swing supplier to the North-west European market
offering seasonal as well as short-term ﬂexibility.demand gas in the warm period of the year when gas is injected
and they become suppliers in the colder periods as gas is with-
drawn. Technical restrictions on injection and withdrawal result in
some inﬂexibility of storage facilities to respond to price signals in
the short term. However, many storages currently under con-
struction are being built for short-run arbitrage opportunities
between spot and contract gas (Stern and Rogers, 2014). Con-
sidering that most storage facilities largely operate on a yearly
planned cycle, Cartea and Williams (2008) argue that deviations
from the expected storage cycle are most relevant for spot price
development. If inventory levels are lower than expected, storage
operators demand a higher price and vice versa for storage levels
above expectations.
Following the approach taken by Cartea and Williams (2008)
and Brown and Yücel (2008), we calculate a storage differential.
This storage differential is calculated as the difference between the
storage on a given day and the average for that day over the past n
years. This can be represented as follows:
( )∅ = − * +… + * * ( )− −S n S n S1 1 1t t t t n365 365
where St is the weighted percentage of total capacity ﬁlled on a
given day and ∅t is the actual deviation from the average ﬁlling
grade of the past n years, measured in percentages. In their paper,
Brown and Yücel use a period of =n 5 years for their analysis. In
this paper, we will use a period of 3 years as reliable data con-
cerning the ﬁlling grade of storages in the respective countries is
available as from the end of 2007.
In order to capture the impact of storage, a variable is con-
structed which measures the deviation in the utilisation level (i.e.
ﬁlling degree) from the average North-west European storage
utilisation level. The countries that possibly inﬂuence the TTF price
through their storage facilities are: Austria, Denmark, France, The
United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.8
Data for the storage variable are available on a weekly basis from
October 2007 onwards. From the 1st of January 2010, data are
available on a daily basis.
Fig. 5 clearly shows two peaks in the beginning of the time
period of analysis. The ﬁrst two peaks are the winters of 2011 and
2012 respectively, which were relatively mild, while the winter of
2013 was colder than average. The winter of 2014 was a very mild
winter, even more than the winters of 2011 and 2012. Storages
were 13% more ﬁlled compared to the 3-year average.
2.4. Resource rents
A factor which is speciﬁcally relevant for a market of natural
resources is the resource rent. According to the resource-depletion
theory of Hotelling (1931), the price of a resource is based on the
actual costs of production and the resource rent. This rent is the
value of having a stock of assets now which can be used in the
future. The conclusion of this theory is that the net price of a
natural resource grows with the rate of interest. This is, however,
not generally observed in reality which can be explained by the
presence of other factors affecting the price, in particular related to
extraction costs, market structure and uncertainty (Gaudet, 2007).
Extraction costs are decreasing over time, due to technologicalother six countries mainly use 3 types of gas storage facilities, namely depleted gas
ﬁelds, aquifers and salt caverns. Data for the storage facility utilisation for the UK,
Belgium, Germany, France and Italy are extracted from Gas Infrastructure Europe
(GIE). GTS provided the data for The Netherlands. Although the database distin-
guishes between the several types of storages, data concerning the actual ﬁlling
grade does not make this distinction. It is therefore impossible to make an analysis
with regard to speciﬁc storage types.
Fig. 5. Difference between current ﬁlling grade and the average seasonal ﬁlling
grade of the past 3 years for the countries Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Source: gas storage: GIE, CUGS and GTS;
HDD: ECA&D; own calculations.
Table 3
Major global gas discoveries between 2011 and 2014.Source: WoodMackenzie.
Discoveries in Bold are included in the analysis.
Announcement date Location Field name Estimated volume
(bcm)
8-8-2011 Iran Madar 347
20-10-2011 Mozambique Mamba South 425
28-12-2011 Cyprus Aphrodite 198
15-5-2012 Mozambique Gulﬁnho 524
16-5-2012 Mozambique Coral 227
18-4-2013 Mozambique Espadarte 204
27-9-2014 Russia Pobeda 498
Table 4
Selected weather stations for construction of West European heating degree days
measure.Source: European Climate Assessment & Data (ECA&D).
Country Weather station Correlation coefﬁcient between tempera-
ture and monthly gas consumption
Austria Innsbruck 0.8827
Belgium Uccle 0.5724
Denmark Hammer Odde
Fyr
0.7499
France Nancy 0.8534
Germany Frankfurt am
Main
0.8244
Italy Verona 0.8519
The Netherlands Schiphol 0.8242
United Kingdom CET 0.8359
D. Hulshof et al. / Energy Policy 94 (2016) 480–491 485progress, which depress prices. The market structure has a strong
inﬂuence on price as in the case of imperfect competition a ten-
dency exists to keep production below the optimum rate which
has an upward effect on prices. Finally, uncertainty about the total
size of the natural resource stock is clearly a factor that inﬂuences
the price.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the market price of a
resource and the marginal natural resource rent is expected to be
positive (Faber and Proops, 1993). The higher the resource rents,
the higher the market price of the natural resource. These authors
ﬁnd a number of factors that inﬂuence the level of resource rents,
such as the availability of the natural resource, the technical pro-
gress in natural resource extraction as well as the time preference
and the length of time horizon of decision makers. In order to
capture some of these factors we include a variable related to the
expected future availability of resources. Based on the resource-
depletion theory, we assume that if the expected size of available
resources increases, the current gas price will be lower.
The effect of large discoveries on the gas price is estimated in
the regression model by including dummy variables for the 3 lar-
gest discoveries, with reserves over 400 bcm each, which were
announced during the sample period. The data is extracted from
WoodMackenzie. Table 3 lists all announced discoveries in the
period 2011–2014 with estimated reserves of 195 bcm and over.
The Russian Pobeda discovery in September 2014 was the only
giant European discovery in this period. One may expect that this
discovery is most relevant for the European market due to its re-
lative proximity to the European market and the existing infra-
structure between Russia and the Europe.2.5. Demand factors
Natural gas is the primary source of heating in North-west
Europe and as such, demand from residential and commercial
users mainly depends on the temperature. Gas consumption is
higher in the cold fall and winter periods and lower in the warmer
spring and summer months. This gives rise to a profound seasonal
pattern in the gas price in North-west Europe. As alternative fuels
for heating are typically limitedly available, gas demand related to
heating is inelastic. In the long run, however, people are able to
switch from heating source and, consequently, the long run de-
mand depends on relative fuel costs.
To control for the inﬂuence of the temperature, a Heating De-
gree Days measure for North-west Europe is estimated. Daily
average temperatures measured at several (geographically dis-
persed) weather stations are extracted from the European Climate
Assessment and Data (ECA&D) for Austria, Denmark, Germany, The
Netherlands, UK, France and Italy. For Belgium, only daily average
minimum and maximum temperatures measured at one weather
station (Uccle) are available. In this case the daily average between
these two is taken. Any gaps in the data are interpolated by taking
the average of the next and previous available observation. Fol-
lowing Mu (2007), we calculate the correlation coefﬁcients be-
tween the temperatures reported at a weather station and the
domestic monthly gas consumption as reported by Eurostat.
Consequently, the weather station that yields the highest corre-
lation coefﬁcient is selected for construction of the North-west
European HDD estimate. Weather stations with a large amount of
missing values are excluded. Table 4 lists the selected weather
station for each country and corresponding correlation coefﬁ-
cients. On the basis of these temperature series, a gas consumption
weighted average daily temperature for North-west Europe is es-
timated which is used to construct the number of Heating Degree
Days with base temperature 18 °C (Fig. 6). The weights are based
on monthly natural gas consumption. The derivation of this vari-
able can be presented as follows:
∑ δ=
( )=
HDD HDD
2
t
i
i m i t
1
8
, ,
where the subscript i denotes the respective country, m the month
of the year and t the respective day of the year. δi m, denotes the
share of gas consumption in country i in total gas consumption of
the selected countries in month m, i.e. δ =i m
q
Q,
i m
m
, , where Qm is total
monthly gas consumption in the selected countries.
Several industrial sectors use gas as primary input into their
production processes. Accordingly, their gas demand depends
primarily on the level of economic activity in the short run. In the
long run, industrial end-users have more options to switch from a
Fig. 7. Industry index (2010¼100), per day in 2011–2014 (own calculations, based
on Eurostat).
Fig. 6. Heating Degree Days in Western Europe, per day in 2011–2014 (own cal-
culations based on ECA&D).
9 As high-frequency data on generation by solar cells are not available for the
period of analysis, we can only measure the impact of RES through the generation
by wind turbines.
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captured by including a monthly volume index (2010¼100) of
gross production of the manufacturing sectors (ln IND) in Austria,
Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, UK, Italy, France and Bel-
gium, extracted from Eurostat. The values for the separate coun-
tries are weighed by using data on the monthly gas consumption
per country (Fig. 7). The following equation presents the calcula-
tion of this variable:
∑ δ=
( )=
IND IND
3
m
i
i m i m
1
8
, ,
where the subscript i denotes the respective country and m the
month and δi m, is the same gas consumption based weighting
factor as in Eq. (2). Note the monthly value of IND is used for all
days in a month.
Moreover, a considerable part of electricity in North-west
Europe is generated using natural gas as input. The demand for gas
by gas-ﬁred electricity generators depends primarily on the price
of gas relative to other fuels used for electricity generation, in
particular coal. In addition, the price of CO2 emission, resulting
from the European Emissions Trading Scheme, affects the relative
cost of gas ﬁred generators to coal ﬁre generators as the latter
emits signiﬁcantly more CO2 in the production of electricity. If theprice for carbon credits increases, gas-ﬁred generators move down
in the power generation merit order, likely at the expense of coal
ﬁred plants, thereby increasing the demand for gas from the
power generation sector. Hence, we include the price of coal and
the price of CO2 to capture these two effects.
The importance of gas in electricity generation varies per
country. In The Netherlands natural gas accounts for the largest
share in power generation, while in France it has a negligible share
due to the intensive use of nuclear energy. Mainly driven by EU
and national policies, there has been a vast increase in the share of
renewables in electricity generation. This holds in particular for
Germany, where the ‘Energiewende’ has resulted in a dramatic
change in the energy mix. Renewables typically have very low
marginal costs and have a lower position in the merit order than
gas ﬁred power plants. Demand for gas from the power sector is
therefore reduced by the rise in renewable capacity in electricity
generation. In order to capture this effect, we include a variable
measuring the production of wind energy. As high-frequency data
on wind energy is available for Germany and this country is cen-
trally located in the North-west European region, we take these
data as proxy for the production of wind energy in this region.9
The day-ahead prediction of electricity generation from wind
power in Germany is extracted from the 4 German TSOs 50 Hertz,
Amperion, TenneT and TransnetBW. The sum of predicted elec-
tricity generation between super peak hours (10:00–19:00) is ta-
ken as it is during these hours when gas ﬁred generators are most
likely to run (Fig. 8).
2.6. Incidental shocks
In addition to the above fundamental factors, we have to con-
trol for a number of incidental shocks to the market. Supply dis-
ruptions can have a profound impact on hub prices. Because
production is concentrated within a limited number of producers,
disruptions in the supply of one company can lead to increased
supply from more expensive sources or a decrease in total market
supply. Given that demand is relatively inelastic in the short run
and the ﬂexibility of the remaining sources of supply is somewhat
limited this can lead to sharp increases in spot prices at hubs
following supply shocks.
In particular we include a dummy for the extremely cold
temperatures throughout North-west and East Europe from the
31st of January until the 19th of February 2012. Gazprom was
unable to meet the dramatic rise in demand for gas leading to
shortages in a number of countries. Moreover, Russia alleged Uk-
raine of gas theft (Henderson and Heather, 2012). In addition, we
include dummies for the Fukushima disaster and the consequent
nuclear shutdown in Japan which have led to a substantial in-
crease in Asian demand for LNG.
2.7. Empirical model
We estimate a linear regression model to investigate how the
above mentioned supply and demand variables contribute to the
short run development of the gas price ( Pt
TTF). This allows us to
identify the existence and strength of a relationship between the
gas price and the selected market fundamentals. The explanatory
variables are the Brent oil price ( )PtBrent , the price of coal (Ptcoal), the
price of CO2 permits ( Pt
CO2), the Heating Degree Days ( HDDt) as
measure for outside temperature, the HHI (HHIt) as measure for
market concentration, an index for industrial activity ( INDt), the
Fig. 8. Generation by wind parks in Germany during peak hours (10:00–19:00), per
day in 2011–2014 (Source: own calculations based on 50 Hertz, Amperion, TenneT,
TransnetBW).
Table 5
ADF unit root test results.
04/01/2011–31/12/2014 04/01/2011–30/09/2014
Levels First differences Levels First differences
ln(TTF gas price) 3.056** 3.063**
ln(Brent oil
price)
1.318 30.355*** 3.763***
ln(Coal price) [/] 2.620 25.225*** 2.479 24.486***
ln(CO2 price) [/] 1.444 29.062*** 1.811 28.015***
Gas storage 1.736 32.324*** 1.658 31.267***
HDD 3.288** 3.260**
ln(HHI) 3.737*** 3.552***
ln(Industry
index)
5.229*** 5.066***
ln(Wind
electricity)
15.611*** 15.302***
Note: ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level. [/] trend included in levels
test equation. The null hypothesis of the ADF test is the existence of a unit root.
10 In order to further test the stationarity, we applied the Dickey–Fuller test on
the residuals of the regression model. Referring to Hamilton (1994), we must reject
the null hypothesis of a unit root. Hence, we conclude that the model can be
viewed as stationary.
D. Hulshof et al. / Energy Policy 94 (2016) 480–491 487ﬁlling degree of storages ( Stort), a measure for the production of
wind electricity in Germany ( ln Windt), two dummies to capture
exogenous shocks to the gas market (Dt
shocks), three dummies to
capture the discovery of new major gas resources (Dp t
DISC
, ) and ﬁ-
nally, dummies to control for the day-of-the-week effect ( Dq
d,
q¼1,2,.,5). Hence, the following model is estimated:
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∑ ∑ ∑
α β π γ
δ ζ ω ρ η
φ υ ξ ε
= + +μ + +
+ + + + + ( )
+ + + ( )+
( )= = =
ln P ln P d ln P d ln P HDD
ln HHI ln IND Stor ln Wind D
D D D
. .
4
t
TTF
t
Brent
t
coal
t
CO
t
t t t t t
F
s s t
shocks
p p p t
DISC
o
o o t
d
t
2
1
2
1
3
,
2
5
,
The subscript t indicates time and d. refers to the ﬁrst differ-
ences of the variables Pcoal and PCO2 which are I(1).
2.8. Statistical tests
The logarithms of all variables that only take up non-zero va-
lues are taken to allow for any nonlinear relationships and to fa-
cilitate interpretation. This concerns all prices, the industry index,
market supply and HHI. Table B.1 in appendix B lists the correla-
tion coefﬁcients between the variables and variation inﬂation
factor (VIF) for all dependent variables, deﬁned as ( − )R1/ 1 2 where
R2 corresponds to the auxiliary regression of each regressor on the
other set of independent variables. The descriptive statistics are
listed in Table B.2 in appendix B. From Table B.1 we conclude that if
we include the full set of independent variables the estimation
may suffer from severe multicollinearity since several VIF esti-
mates are undesirably high. This seems to be caused by the high
correlation between the coal price, CO2 price and discovery
dummies. If the CO2 price and discovery dummies are omitted
from the model, the VIF estimates are in an acceptable range. We
estimate versions of the model both including and excluding these
four variables. The sign of the coefﬁcients and signiﬁcance levels
are unaffected. The White test indicates that the null hypothesis of
homoskedastic errors is rejected and therefore the equations are
estimated with White robust standard errors. In order to control
for serial correlation in the dependent variable, we include the lag
of this variable as additional explanatory variable.
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit root tests are used to test
for the presence of unit roots in the variables. Table 5 reports the
test results for the full sample period and a subsample period
excluding the last quarter of 2014. For the reported results, the lag
length selection is based on the Bayesian information criterion.For the full sample period, the gas price, industry index, gas
supply, HDD, HHI and wind electricity variables are stationary in
levels. The CO2 and the coal price are non-stationary in levels but
stationary in their ﬁrst differences which are, therefore, included
in the linear regression. Although the test indicates that the sto-
rage differential is non-stationary, we are sceptical regarding this
result. There is no theoretical ground for non-stationarity in this
case due to the ﬁxed limits of the variable and seasonal utilisation
of storage capacity. The storage differential, therefore, is treated as
I(0).
Moreover, the ADF test suggests that the oil price is non-sta-
tionary in levels. However, a visual inspection (see Fig. 1) of the oil
price does not object to stationarity. Rather, there seems to be a
structural break at the last quarter of the sample period, when the
oil price almost halved in three months subsequent to a sharp
decrease on the 1st of October 2014. A Chow test conﬁrms the
existence of a structural break on this date (F(13, 712)-test statistic
is 1.87). The ADF test results for the subsample excluding the last
quarter of the sample are materially the same for all variables,
except for the oil price which is now stationary in levels. To derive
a consistent estimator for the effect of the oil price, we therefore
proceed with the subsample excluding the last quarter of 2014.10
Some of the independent variables may suffer from an en-
dogeneity bias due to reverse causality. The storage differential
and oil price are possibly a function of the gas price themselves
because oil and gas are competing fuels while the storage facilities
may react to gas price ﬂuctuations. One could argue, along the
lines of the Lucas critique, that oil prices and storage behaviour are
inﬂuenced by expected future gas prices, which would invalidate
the exogeneity of the instruments. Other credible alternative
exogenous instruments are, however, difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Hausman
endogeneity tests are used to assess whether gas storage and the
oil price are exogenously determined. The results are reported in
Table 6. The instruments used are the ﬁrst order lags of the re-
spective variable. The results imply that the gas storage differential
is exogenously determined whereas the oil price is not. To obtain
consistent estimates we use instrumental variable (IV) regression
using the ﬁrst order lag of the oil price as instrument for the
current oil price.
Table 6
Hausman F-test statistics for exogeneity
using the ﬁrst order lag as instrument
(p-value in parentheses) and F-test sta-
tistic for instrument relevance.
Hausman
ln(Brent oil price) 4.80 (0.028)**
Gas storage 0.28 (0.597)
Instrument relevance
l.ln(Brent oil price) 9906
l.Gas storage 68,037
Note: ** Statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
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The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 7.
To take into account that the estimation may suffer from multi-
collinearity two versions of (4) are estimated. The complete model
in Table 7 includes all dependent variables whereas in the other
model the CO2 price and discovery dummy variables are excluded.
Exclusion does not materially change the results for the other
variables.
The regression estimations conﬁrm that supply and demand
fundamentals are important for short-run price determination and
that prices are to a large extent determined by gas-to-gas com-
petition. The ﬁrst order lag of the gas price is highly important for
the current gas price. The coefﬁcient of approximately 0.92 sug-
gests a high degree of inertia within the system. The estimates
imply that the Brent oil price positively affects the day-ahead TTF
gas price, but the effect is small. The elasticity in the complete
model is 0.054 and 0.042 in the parsimonious model i.e. an in-
crease in the price of oil by 10% increases the gas price by 0.42–
0.54%. Changes in the price of coal have a positive but insigniﬁcant
effect on the spot price of gas. This positive relationship is in line
with the direct fuel competition between coal and gas in the
power sector. The price of CO2 does not seem to have inﬂuenced
the spot price of gas during the sample period. Our estimates for
the macroeconomic indicator are positive but insigniﬁcant. De-
viations from the average level of storage capacity utilisation help
explain daily ﬂuctuations in the gas price, as the coefﬁcients areTable 7
Results of IV regressions analysis over 2011–2014.
Complete model
ln(TTF gas price) Coefﬁcient Standard e
constant 0.0804615 0.1276223
l.ln(TTF gas price) 0.9210672*** 0.0141282
ln(Brent oil price) 0.0536673** 0.0232900
d.ln(Coal price) 0.1067752 0.1034514
ln(Industry index) 0.0176299 0.0193639
d.ln(CO2 price) 0.0378437 0.0262201
Gas storage 0.0007680*** 0.0001867
HDD 0.0008540*** 0.0002735
ln(HHI) 0.0030387 0.0243265
ln(wind electricity Germany) 0.0031654*** 0.0011417
Dummy Fukushima 0.0050091 0.0051273
Dummy Russia 2012 0.0000160 0.0085338
Dummy DISC_1 0.0062035 0.0048638
Dummy DISC_2 0.0026992 0.0039164
Dummy DISC_3 0.0226407 0.0217259
Dummy day_2 0.0059824* 0.0032626
Dummy day_3 0.0100036*** 0.0032646
Dummy day_4 0.0119538*** 0.0032388
Dummy day_5 0.0051642 0.0032500
R2 0.95
N 901
Note: ***, ** and * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. We us the ﬁsigniﬁcantly negative. When the ﬁlling degree of storage facilities
is below expected levels, the spot price of gas is higher. The esti-
mated effect is small as the point estimate implies that a 1 per-
centage point increase in the deviation from average utilisation is
associated with a decrease in the gas price of approximately
0.0007–0.0008%.
As expected the coefﬁcients for heating degree days are posi-
tive and signiﬁcant at 1%, implying that the outside temperature is
important for the short run development of the gas price.
There appears to be no effect of a change in the HHI on the spot
price of gas. This effect is negative but statistically not signiﬁcant.
While the daily average HHI increased from 1905 in 2011 to 2098
in 2014, the degree of competition as measured by the HHI did not
affect spot price development. Suppliers of gas to the European
market do not seem to be able to exert market power and prof-
itably raise prices. Therefore, pricing of natural gas at European
hubs appears to be competitive and not affected by the degree of
competition
In contrast with our a priori expectation, the sign of expected
German wind generation is positive and signiﬁcant at 1%. The
estimated effect is small: a 0.032% increase in the day-ahead TTF
price for a 1% increase in expected generation of wind. Further
investigation into the Dutch–German cross-border electricity
connection, however, reveals that when expected wind generation
in Germany is high, the Dutch TSO operating the cross-border
connection, TenneT, reduces the available cross-border electricity
connection capacity signiﬁcantly in order to deal with loop ﬂows
(TenneT, 2014). Consequently, domestic electricity production in
The Netherlands needs to be increased to meet demand which
raises the demand for gas from the Dutch power sector causing a
minor upward pressure on the gas price. Hence, this result re-
garding the effect of renewable electricity on the gas price is re-
lated to the fact that renewable electricity may create bottlenecks
in the electricity grid through loop ﬂows. Loop ﬂows are un-
scheduled ﬂows stemming from scheduled ﬂows within a neigh-
bouring bidding market. Unscheduled ﬂows are implicitly priori-
tised in the current market, which means that the size of the
cross-border capacity which is available for trade is calculated
after controlling for (expected) loop ﬂows (Thema Consulting
Group, 2013). The existence of this problem is related to the dis-
tinction between the deﬁnitions of regional markets and theExcluding discovery dummies and CO2 price
rror Coefﬁcient Standard error
0.0302767 0.1168564
0.9250257*** 0.0136737
0.0424412** 0.021053
0.1184197 0.1035376
0.0122521 0.019169
0.0007494*** 0.0001837
0.0006889*** 0.0002445
0.0079741 0.0199788
0.0031312*** 0.0011424
0.0010574 0.0041612
0.001855 0.0086916
0.0057887* 0.0032657
0.0096806*** 0.0032667
0.0115321*** 0.0032364
0.0049093 0.0032558
0.95
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D. Hulshof et al. / Energy Policy 94 (2016) 480–491 489physical realities of the electricity networks. An policy option to
solve this problem is to introduce dynamic prices for using the
grid, resulting in electricity prices which are not only related to the
demand and supply of electricity but also to the existence of
network constraints. If these problems regarding international
trade in electricity markets would be solved, an increase in the
supply of renewable electricity may be expected to have a negative
effect on the demand for gas and, hence, the price of gas, as gas-
ﬁred power plants may be switched off to keep the power system
in balance.
The Fukushima nuclear disaster did not lead to higher spot gas
prices at the TTF. In addition, we do not ﬁnd evidence that the
extremely cold weather in February 2012 throughout Europe had a
signiﬁcant effect on the TTF gas price. Regarding the giant dis-
coveries, none of the giant discoveries had a signiﬁcant effect on
the spot price. Perhaps the typically high degree of uncertainty
associated with new discoveries, for example regarding the true
size of the recoverable reserves, is a reason for the lack of a re-
action in gas spot prices. Another suggestion is that the lag be-
tween discovery and extraction is too long to have an effect on the
current price.
The high degree of persistence in the gas price may to some
extent reﬂect the high degree of persistence in the underlying
fundamental variables. Temperature tends to develop relatively
smoothly while gas storage and supply are also fairly inﬂexible in
the short term as a result of technical restrictions and planned
cycles. Disentangling ﬂexible and inﬂexible supply sources and
storage facilities should provide more clear evidence on these
mechanisms although data limitations currently complicate such
an analysis4. Conclusions and policy implications
We have found that the gas prices at hubs can be viewed as
prices resulting from gas-to-gas competition. Fundamental factors
affecting demand or supply in the gas market have signiﬁcant
effects on the movements in the day-ahead gas price. Although the
price of gas is still related to the price of oil, this linkage is not
strong anymore. Moreover, the high degree of concentration on
the supply side of the gas market does not affect the gas price,
suggesting that the market prices are not distorted by a lack of
competition.
Our ﬁndings indicate that the policy measures implemented
in the North-west European countries to introduce competition
in wholesale gas markets and to integrate these markets by
reducing cross-border barriers appear to have been successful in
realising an efﬁciently working gas market. These effective
policy measures are related to the capacity-allocation mechan-
isms and congestion management as well as investments in
cross-border capacity. Policies to further integrate national gas
markets within Europe may extend this gas-to-gas competition
to a larger region. These policies may contribute to realise a fully
integrated European energy market as it is pursued by the
European Commission (EC, 2015).Acknowledgements
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Table B.2
Descriptive statistics (all daily averages)Sources: TTF gas price, Brent oil price: ICIS
Heren; Coal price, CO2 price: Bloomberg; HDD: ECA&D; Gas storage: GIE/GTS; Sup-
ply: Eclipse; HHI: own calculations; Industry index: Eurostat; Wind electricity:
50Hertz, Amperion, TenneT, TransnetBW.
2011 2012 2013 2014
TTF gas price
(€/MWh)
Min 15.6 20.78 24.85 14.88
Max 25.85 37.63 41 26.85
Average 22.71 25.00 27.03 20.41
Std. Deviation 1.36 2.04 2.2 3.24
Brent oil price (€/Barrel)
Min 69.97 70.29 73.80 73.64
Max 87.75 97.60 89.73 84.64
Average 80.52 86.88 81.84 78.57
Std. Deviation 3.33 5.17 3.22 2.25
North-west European coal price
(€/Tonne)
Min 109.5 83 72.6 71.4
Max 133.00 110.95 90.5 86.4
Average 121.55 92.45 81.62 76.13
Std. Deviation 5.47 5.95 4.68 3.22
CO2 price (€/Tonne)
Min 6.57 5.73 2.75 4.44
Max 17.46 9.52 6.66 7.19
Average 13.00 7.49 4.52 5.80
Std. Deviation 3.12 0.73 0.67 0.60
HDD (Degree Celcius)
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 18.9 24.17 19.37 15.67
Average 5.83 7.03 7.28 4.82
Std. Deviation 5.38 6.20 6.15 4.74
Deviation from average gas storage ﬁlling degree
(percentage point)
Min 7.33 4.18 37.72 2.05
Max 10.58 14.2 2.82 15.2
Average 3.65 2.24 11.37 9.42
Std. Deviation 3.43 5.69 7.51 4.51
HHI
Min 1780 1820 1931 1876
Max 2118 2150 2403 2242
Average 1905 1944 2107 2083
Std. Deviation 75 67 101 58
Supply (GWh)
Min 8524 8278 9238 8484
Max 16,128 15,566 13,655 12,830
Average 12,103 11,791 11,697 10,569
Std. Deviation 1934 1840 1080 1129
Industry index
Min 90.09 87.57 86.29 84.45
Max 115.73 111.75 110.18 109.57
Average 104.47 101.41 100.86 101.69
Std. Deviation 7.27 7.04 6.51 7.20
Production of wind electricity in Germany
(GWh) 10:00–19:00
Min 2.97 2.52 3.38 3.00
Max 155.98 175.47 204.82 178.30
Average 43.48 45.54 45.33 43.15
Std. Deviation 37.00 35.27 40.61 38.14
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via which non-indigenous gas supply enters the North-west
European system.
The relevant border points are listed per supply source below.
The TSO at the arriving end of the border point is noted between
brackets.
Norway
1. Zeebrugge Pipeline Terminal (Fluxys)
2. Emden EPT (Gasunie Deutschland)
3. Emden NPT (Gasunie Deutschland)
4. Dunkerque (GRT gaz de France)
5. Emden EPT (GTS)
6. Emden NPT (GTS)
7. Easington (National Grid)
8. St. Fergus Shell (National Grid)
9. St. Fergus Total (National Grid)
10. Dornum (Open Grid Europe)
11. Emden EPT (Open Grid Europe)
12. Emden NPT (Open Grid Europe)
13. Teesside (National Grid)
14. Emden EPT (Thyssengas)
15. Dornum (Gasunie Deutschland)
16. Dornum (Jordgas)
Russia
1. Velke Kapusany (Eustream)
2. Greifswald (OPAL)
3. Greifswald (NEL)
4. Kondratki (GAZ-SYSTEM)
Algeria
1. Tarifa (Enagas)
2. Almeria (Enagas)
3. Gela (Snam)
4. Mazara (Snam)
LNG
1. Montoir (GRT gaz de France Nord)
2. Fos (GRT gaz de France Sud)
3. Isle of Grain (National Grid)
4. Teesside (National Grid)
5. Zeebrugge LNG (Fluxys)
6. Southook (National Grid)
7. Dragon (National Grid)
8. Barcelona (Enagas)
9. Bilbao (Enagas)
10. Cartagena (Enagas)
11. Huelva (Enagas)
12. Mugardos (Enagas)
13. Sagunto (Enagas)
14. Panigaglia (Snam)
15. Rovigo (Snam)
16. Sines (REN)
17. Gate LNG (GTS)
18. Livorno (Snam)Appendix B. Correlation coefﬁcients and descriptive statistics
See Table B.1 and Table B.2References
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